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LEVEL II

ISSUES AND ANSWERS: THE U.S. ARMY COMMAND INFORMATION PROGRAM

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
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by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the response of specified Command Information publications to the issues of dissent in the U.S. Army. Both descriptive and historical methods are used to present the results of the research. The evolution of the U.S. Army Command Information Program from World War II until the present is treated. The issues involved in dissent by today's soldiers are presented by a review of the writings of some of the dissenters and of some six underground newspapers published during 1969-1970. The coverage of these issues by Army Digest and Commanders' Call during 1970 is determined by a type of content analysis. The conclusions are that the Command Information Program suffers from a lack of research into the attitudes of today's soldiers and that the two publications, Army Digest and Commanders' Call, do not provide sufficient coverage of the issues of dissent.

Preface

The terms "dissent" and "dissident" appear frequently in this thesis. They are central to the thesis and an understanding of the distinction between them and more routine morale problems is essential to the proper understanding of the thesis.

Perhaps it is easiest to explain "dissent" in terms of what it is not. It is not what is commonly referred to as "gripping" or "bitching." These latter terms are used to describe characteristics which are considered to be integral parts of the soldiers' attitudes and make-up. Indeed, they are sometimes considered desirable attributes: the adage that the troops are not happy unless they have something to complain about may not be completely true; it contains enough truth, however, that it has been accepted as dogma by generations of soldiers. The "bitcher" in effect is saying that he is unhappy with his situation or a particular condition and he is going to let the world know that he is unhappy. But he acknowledges the reasons for the conditions which displease him and, at least inwardly, accepts the necessity for them; still, he expects the right to complain about them.

The dissenter, on the other hand, refuses to accept the necessity for conditions which displease him. He sees

certain procedures and acts as deliberate violations of his rights or the rights of others--and he is determined to act to eliminate those practices or to frustrate their implementation.

Webster's New World Dictionary defines "dissent" as: 1. to disagree; think differently, or, 2. to refuse to accept the doctrines and forms of an established church. If we substitute "established system" for "established church" in the latter definition, we have an adequate description of the dissenter in the Army. He refuses to accept the established system of the military and, because he is forced to be a part of that system, he acts to change it. He differs from the "bitcher" not only in degree but also in nature.

It is important to note that the dissenter is not necessarily antagonistic to the military establishment; he may well accept the ultimate goals and purpose of the military and confine his dissident activities to those particular aspects of the system which he considers to be unjustified. On the other hand, he may be completely opposed to the very existence of the military establishment. This thesis does not attempt to distinguish between these extremes of dissent.

Since much of the dissent in today's Army can be placed in the category of social protest, it is important to understand the nature of the Army's role in combating social problems. In Chapter 5 I have noted that John Steward Ambler recognizes the citizenship training as one of the military's

three major functions (the other two are national security and the maintenance of domestic order); certainly the combating of social problems is a part of citizenship training and is rightfully one of the Army's responsibilities. In fact, the Army is widely recognized as a leader in this area, particularly in regards to racial equality. But this social responsibility must not be supposed to take precedence over, or even be equated with, the Army's primary functions.

That the maintenance of national security and domestic order are the primary functions of the military is recognized in the Constitution of the United States (Section 8 and the 2nd Amendment). The secondary function of citizenship training must not be allowed to interfere with the primary functions. Certainly the Army, and the other military services must make every effort to combat social problems; but to do this at the expense of the primary functions would be to negate the very reason for the existence of a military force. Insofar as the demands of the dissenters would detract from the performance of the primary functions they should be ignored; otherwise, they must be listened to and evaluated on their individual merits.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the two persons who gave me the greatest help in the preparation of this thesis. Lieutenant Colonel Prescott Eaton, US Army Command and Staff College, served as a devil's advocate and sounding board for many of my half-baked ideas. Without his guidance, perception and constant prodding, this thesis would

still be in the outline stage and I would still be blissfully barking up all the blind alleys. My wife, Marva, maintained her composure under the constant assaults of my irascible temper and illegible handwriting to turn out page after page of typed copy. To both of them: Thanks.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

This study was prompted by a personal observation that the Command Information media prepared by the Department of the Army, in particular the Army Digest, were not addressing the issues of dissent among today's soldiers. It seemed, on the basis of a cursory review of the media, that an inordinate amount of coverage was devoted to matters of little interest to the average soldier with a proportionately small coverage of topics which might concern him. In an era of increasing dissent and criticism of the Army this appeared to be a less than adequate approach for a program which has the objective of motivating soldiers to perform to the limit of their abilities.

In order to test the hypothesis stated above, I began by examining the historical background of the Command Information Program from World War II in order to determine how today's program had evolved. The sources employed for this examination were almost exclusively official government records and the applicable Army regulations. The results of this part of the study are contained in Chapter 2.

Identifying the issues of dissent was the second step; it was not particularly difficult in that the national press and recognized authorities on military

affairs have addressed this problem in some detail. I tried however, to place the most emphasis on the issues as enumerated by the dissenters themselves, either in formal publications or in various "underground" GI newspapers. I made every attempt to choose those issues which were current in the 1969 to early 1970 time-frame so as to insure that the Command Information media examined (1970) would have had sufficient time to recognize and respond to them. I also attempted to identify only those issues which have a broad, Army-wide application so that they could reasonably be expected to be the concern of the Department of the Army rather than just that of local commands. Chapter 3 records the results of this effort.

Reviewing the Command Information media to determine the Army's response to the issues of dissent presented a problem of selectivity: the Department of the Army produces numerous publications and films for the Command Information Program and the Department of Defense produces a similar large quantity of such materials. From these voluminous materials, however, two are conspicuous as a result of their widespread distribution: Army Digest and Commanders Call. Army Digest (to be retitled Soldiers with the June 1971 issue) as the official Army magazine is printed in large volume and distributed down to the company level; a survey conducted by Department of the Army in May 1970 indicates

that 51.8% of all Army enlisted men read Army Digest.¹

The coverage obtained by Commanders Call is not so easy to establish: it is distributed to company level but its presentation to the troops is strictly at the option of the unit commander. Since, however, it is published in support of a mandatory training requirement, it is valid to assume that most unit commanders make use of it when they feel that it addresses issues applicable to their command. For these reasons I concentrated on these two publications for the basis of my analysis of the media. As explained in the preceding paragraph I limited my analysis to the volumes of these publications issued in 1970. Chapter 4 contains the results of this analysis and a review of objectives and organizations of the current Command Information Program. As with the issues, I reviewed the media and the program in terms of broad and general areas so as to avoid unique, local problems.

My findings are listed in Chapter 5. Also there are recommendations for further research.

¹Headquarters, Department of the Army, OPOPM Report No. 10-71-E, Sample Survey of Military Personnel as of 31 May 1970, p. 8.

Chapter 2

BACKGROUND

The United States Army has long recognized the need for an effective program to keep its members informed of policies and developments which had an impact on the military. The observation of Baron von Steuben during the Revolutionary War that the American soldier could not simply be told that he must do things in a certain way but must be told why he was to do a thing is perhaps the earliest record of this need.¹ That the Army today still considers this an important requirement is evidenced by the inclusion of "keep your men informed" as one of the eleven principles of leadership taught as official Army doctrine.² Although it is not the purpose of this paper to trace the historical evolution of this principle from its inception, it is important to understand its more recent applications in the United States Army. The current Command Information Program is a development from earlier programs and can be better understood if its development is outlined. For this reason, the remainder of this

¹Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), pp. 63-64.

²Department of the Army, FM 22-100, Military Leadership (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 November 1965), p. 21.

chapter will review the development of the Army Command Information Program from World War II until the present.

During the early stages of World War II, the functions of what is now referred to as command information were fragmented among various agencies and divisions at the War Department level.³ In addition, these agencies were also responsible for activities which today are included in the category of Special Services (e.g. entertainment and sports activities). The Psychological Warfare Branch, G2, was one of these original agencies concerned with the morale of United States troops. Early in the war, this aspect of the Branch's activities was transferred to the Morale Branch of the Office of the Chief of Staff. Official government records give the reason for the transfer as due to "newspaper publicity"⁴ presumably unfavorable, and presumably directed at the undesirability of combining foreign propaganda and troop information under one agency.

The Morale Branch and its successors (Special Services Branch and Special Service Division, Army Service Forces) handled troop information and education activities until October 1943 when this function was transferred to the Information and Education Division. Initially this division functioned under the Director of Military Training,

³The National Archives, Federal Records of World War II, 11 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 104 and 272.

⁴Ibid., p. 104.

Army Service Force. From November 1943 to August 1944, as the Morale Services Division, it came under the Director of Personnel, Army Service Force. It became an independent division of the Army Service Force in August 1944 and remained such until September 1945 when it was transferred to the General Staff and made a special staff division. Although the numerous and frequent changing of names and controlling agencies which troop information underwent can probably be partially accounted for by the reorganizations which were accomplished within the War Department during this time frame,⁵ it seems safe to assume that it was also partially due to the failure of senior War Department staff officers and civilian chiefs to recognize the important service provided by the troop information function. This assumption is supported by Dr. Samuel Stouffer, Director of Professional Staff, Research Branch, Information and Education Division.⁶

The Information and Education Division was functionally organized into functional branches to handle its various responsibilities. Of the operating (as opposed to administrative) branches, the Army Education and Special Service Projects Branches were concerned with non-military education programs for troops, and as such are not within

⁵Ibid., p. 68.

⁶Samuel A. Stouffer "et al.", Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Vol. 1, The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 12.

the scope of this study. The other branches contributed directly to the troop information function and are described below.

The Army Information Branch supervised the preparation and production of several Army publications which were disseminated to the troops, including the Information and Education Digest and Notes on Morale Items. It published the weekly domestic edition of Yank and provided features to overseas editions of Yank as well as to other overseas newspapers and radio stations. The branch was also involved in planning and reviewing the production of motion pictures such as "Why We Fight" series and the "Army-Navy Screen Magazine." The Armed Forces Radio Service, which provided radio broadcasts and popular radio programs (minus commercials) to overseas areas, operated under the Information Branch.

The function of the Army Orientation Branch was to explain the origins and issues of the war to Army personnel. This program was initially operated by the Bureau of Public Relations. Activities of the Branch included the preparation and distribution of reading and discussion materials such as Orientation Fact Sheets, Army Talks and the GI Roundtable series. The latter item was prepared in cooperation with the American Historical Association.⁷

Perhaps the most interesting of the branches of the

⁷The National Archives, op. cit., p. 275.

Information and Education Division was the Research Branch. Its mission was to provide the Army with facts about the attitudes of soldiers, which facts might be helpful in the formulation of policy.⁸ The branch employed such measures as opinion polls and direct interviews with soldiers to arrive at its conclusions. Approximately 200 investigations and 400 reports were conducted and prepared by the branch, covering such problems as racial tension, the quality of Army food, officer candidate schools, and awards and decorations.⁹ The studies of the Research Branch were instrumental in the adoption by the War Department of the point system for demobilization (based on various factors such as length of service and combat duty), and the development of the legislative action which became known as the "GI bill."¹⁰

Much of the information collected by the Research Branch was passed on to field commanders, and, eventually, to the individual soldier in the form of a monthly publication, What the Soldier Thinks.

The period immediately following the war saw a rapid curtailing of troop information activities as the Army demobilized. In spite of the cutbacks, however, several key moves were made to increase the effectiveness of the program. In December 1945, Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins was appointed as the Army's first Director

⁸Stouffer, op. cit., p. 5.

⁹The National Archives, op. cit., p. 275.

¹⁰Stouffer, op. cit., p. 7.

of Information, responsible for coordinating all War Department information activities. In 1946, the Army Information School (now the Defense Information School) was established. Both of these actions were a result of recommendations made by studies conducted for the War Department by Arthur W. Page, Vice President for Public Relations, Bell Telephone Company.¹¹

The reorganization of the national military establishment in 1947 into what is now known as the Department of Defense had a very definite impact on all aspects of the Army's information program. The Department of Defense assumed more and more of the responsibilities for troop information activities in specified areas. The division of these responsibilities between the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army is covered in Chapter 4.

The increasing centralization of information responsibilities at Department of Defense level, and the advent of the Cold War were the chief features of the Army's troop information program from the period 1949 to 1962. The build-up of the Army during the Korean War caused an increase in emphasis on the program. In 1955 the Office of the Chief of Public Information was established

¹¹Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Information, A New Direction for Army Information: Final Report of the Smith Committee (Washington: 1969), p. 1-5. (Hereafter referred to as the Smith Report.)

and in 1956 this office assumed responsibility for troop information as well as public information. Also in 1956, the Information Specialist program was established. This year also saw the separation of the education function from the information function. In 1958 and again in 1961, a civilian research firm, the Market Planning Corporation, was hired to study the Army's information activities.¹² These studies, however, were aimed primarily at the Army's image with the external public and contributed only peripherally to the troop information function. Also in 1961, the Office of the Adjutant General conducted an internal study to determine the attitudes of Army personnel toward the Army. In 1962, the Office of the Chief of Information, in response to the two 1961 studies, convened a special committee (the Shoemaker Committee) to evaluate the earlier studies.¹³ The Shoemaker Committee made the following recommendations in regard to troop information activities:

1. Place increased emphasis on Army roles and the positive aspects of the Army way of life in projects directed toward internal audiences.

2. Recognize and make full use of a differentiated approach to Army internal audiences.

3. Revise the information themes and establish a relative priority for their use. Specifically, the themes should be recast and reoriented with emphasis as follows:

- a. Primary theme: "The U.S. Army is an essential force for freedom."

¹²Ibid., p. 1-7.

¹³Ibid., p. 1-8.

b. Major supporting themes:

(1) Roles and Forces. Emphasis on versatility and air defense; . . .

(2) Quality Personnel. Emphasis on high-caliber personnel, the dynamic aspects of individual assignments, the challenge and reward of Army life, and the contributions Army personnel make to the nation in peace and war.

(3) Modernization. Emphasis on organization, materiel, tactics, and management.

c. The following common themes to be woven into plans and activities developed to support the program objective:

(1) Teamwork. Army tasks require a team effort by all members of the ONE ARMY to include dependents, civilian employees, the retired alumni, and friends of the Army, as well as military personnel of the three components.

(2) Efficiency. The Army does its job using modern methods, incorporating the best civilian procedural and management practices where practical, to make the most of its manpower and material resources.¹⁴

Another event in 1962 which had a major impact on the Army's troop information activities was the hearings conducted by the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate on military cold war education policies. One recommendation of the committee was "that every effort be made to make troop information as hard-hitting, factual, interesting, and inspiring as possible . . ."¹⁵ Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, subcommittee chairman, in a statement to the subcommittee on April 3, 1962,

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 1-9 and 1-11.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 1-11.

expressed the general attitude of the subcommittee:

We must be certain that our military personnel have the essential ideological training which will enable them to grasp and comprehend the cherished traditions and principles of our American democracy as well as the nature of the tyrannical forces which threaten it with destruction. We can be fully successful in this effort only if we instill in each member of the armed services a sense of personal dedication to our country and its heritage so that he will be a determined and unfaltering member of our defense team in peace as well as in war.¹⁶

Beginning in 1949, the Department of the Army published a series of regulations governing the objectives and policies of the troop information program. A review of the key features of these regulations will help develop an understanding of the evolution of the program.

In 1949 the stated objective of the troop information program was to assist commanders in developing among their subordinates "intelligent, cooperative, and loyal effort toward the accomplishment of any mission." This objective included the policy of keeping members of the Army informed of significant matters "to the end that they may better understand and evaluate their responsibilities as servicemen and citizens." The program was implemented through various media and procedures: a weekly troop information hour which, to facilitate discussion, would normally be conducted with units of platoon size; off-duty discussion periods on a voluntary basis; official publications and motion pictures;

¹⁶U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Preparedness, Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, Pt. 3, Hearing 87th Congress, Second Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 1315.

local command newspapers where feasible; and the Armed Forces Radio Service for personnel stationed overseas. Guidelines were established for a "Troop Attitude Research Program" to assist in developing troop information materials.¹⁷ Also, in 1949, the basic objectives of the program were elaborated in more detail. The goal was defined as to foster in the soldier: "belief in the importance of the individual . . .; belief in American democratic principles . . .; understanding of the mission of the armed forces . . .;" and "understanding of critical domestic and foreign policies, and the peoples of the world."¹⁸

A revised regulation published in 1950 made only minor changes in the program. The objective was reworded to read, "to motivate and inform military personnel by providing the most essential facts to the greatest number of individuals . . . to enable them to discharge their duties with the greatest degree of understanding." The implementing media remained the same with one exception: the inclusion of a special troop information program for basic trainees to assist in the transition from civilian to military life.¹⁹

¹⁷Department of the Army, AR 355-5, Troop Information and Education: General Provisions (Washington: Government Printing Office, 11 May 1949), pp. 1-3.

¹⁸Department of the Army, AR 355-20, Troop Information and Education: Troop Information (Washington: Government Printing Office, 21 June 1949), p. 1.

¹⁹Department of the Army, AR 355-5, Troop Information and Education: General Provisions (Washington: Government Printing Office, 17 August 1950), pp. 1-2.

Guidelines for the use of commanders in implementing the troop information program were included in the 1953 regulation. These guidelines were: to anticipate information needs; information must be factual and complete as well as timely, pertinent and understandable; information needs change constantly; troop information is a continuous process; and political information will be impartial, non-partisan and objective.²⁰

Revisions to the troop information regulations were published in 1955 and 1957, but involved only minor changes. The year 1964, however, saw the publication of Army Regulation 360-81, Command Information, General Provisions, which included some significant additions to the program. It should be remembered that this new regulation was published following the study of the Shoemaker Committee and the hearings of the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Listed below are some of the key features of the new regulation: a change in name from "troop information" to "command information;" inclusion of an objective of understanding the "true nature of the communist threat;"²¹ a warning that "under no circumstances" will command information discussion periods "assume the form of attacks against American principles . . . or

²⁰Department of the Army, AR 355-5, Troop Information and Education: General Provisions (Washington: Government Printing Office, 12 March 1953), p. 4.

²¹Department of the Army, AR 360-81, Command Information, General Provisions (Washington: Government Printing Office, 20 April 1964), p. 1.

the advocacy of ideologies and forms of government hostile to the interests of the United States;"²² an evaluation system based on a quarterly "Command Information Report" which was aimed primarily at reporting accomplishments under the program but which contained a section where subordinate commanders could identify deficiencies in the program.²³

Following the publication of AR 360-81 in 1964, no significant changes were made in the command information program until 1968. In that year, however, recognizing the need for a reevaluation of the program, the Army's Chief of Information directed that a new study be made. A committee was established under the direction of Brigadier General Robert B. Smith, Deputy Chief of Information, to "isolate inadequacies in the current Army Information Program and to provide recommendations for solving the problems identified."²⁴

The Smith Committee submitted its report of findings and recommendations in 1969. Many of the conclusions were related to areas beyond the scope of this study (e.g. the fields of public information and community relations; requirements for expansion into electronic communications media; and problems arising from an increased centralization

²²Ibid., p. 4.

²³Ibid., pp. 26-27.

²⁴The Smith Report, op. cit., p. 1-12.

of information responsibilities at the Department of Defense level). Many of the Smith Committee's recommendations apply to all aspects of the information program, and cannot be categorized as exclusively in the area of public or command information; some of them (as will be seen in Chapter 4) have been implemented to one degree or another. The general thrust of the findings and recommendations of the committee insofar as they relate to the subject of this study were: the command information program suffers from lack of command interest; it needs to be more responsive to the needs of all internal publics; there is a shortage of qualified information officers to fill requirements; inadequate instruction on the information function is provided at Army service and staff schools; and the review, analysis and evaluation procedures are inadequate.²⁵ (The preceding list of findings and recommendations is necessarily selective and limited; in subsequent chapters of this paper, where specific findings of the Smith Committee are confirmed, or refuted, by my analysis, appropriate notation will be made.)

Following the report of the Smith Committee, a new command information regulation was published in 1970. The specifics of that regulation, and a more detailed look at the current command information are covered in Chapter 4.

²⁵Ibid., ch. IX.

Chapter 3

THE ISSUES

It is no trick now, nor was it twenty years ago, to find dissent and discontent among military ranks; . . . But there is something different about it now . . . ; it is that many young men feel no particular obligation to serve the nation in its armed forces.¹

Dissent is not a new phenomenon to the United States Army, as Ward Just reminds us in the above quotation. Indeed, the military has always been a subject for discontent in American society. As Samuel Huntington relates, the military has no "recognized function in a liberal society" and, as it is outside of the "American ideological consensus," it has been a "universal target group."² Huntington identifies four attitudes which characterize the American approach to military affairs: the military is seen as a threat to liberty, democracy, economic prosperity, and peace.³

Perhaps more illustrative of our general attitude toward the military, however, is the way it is treated in our entertainment media, particularly since World War II. One treatment has been farcical, in which the professional military have been portrayed as bungling and inefficient (e.g.

¹Ward Just, "Soldiers," The Atlantic, October, 1970, p. 77.

²Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 154.

³Ibid., p. 156.

the "Sergeant Bilko" television series and the "Beetle Bailey" comic strip). Even when the military was pictured in a more favorable light, such as in the familiar combat motion picture, the professional soldier is frequently portrayed as lacking the great American virtue of "common sense" which is a characteristic of the citizen soldier. The serious literature of the period such as James Jones' From Here to Eternity and The Thin Red Line, and Norman Mailer's The Naked and the Dead has painted a more damning picture of the career military man: corrupt, self-seeking, and unconcerned with the lives of the men under his command. The few officers, and non-commissioned officers, who did not fit this mold were usually destroyed by the system. While these attitudes are primarily from sources external to the military, it is inconceivable that they do not carry over into the ranks as large numbers of young men enter the military service.

Whatever has been the past image of the Army and the existence of dissent, however, there can be little doubt to anyone who follows the popular news media that the image is poor and that dissent today is widespread and vocal. This chapter will explore the general nature of dissent in the Army today and attempt to identify the broad categories of issues which concern today's soldiers. The views of several authorities on military affairs will be considered; however, the major reliance will be on the writings of the dissenters themselves. This approach is open to criticism

on the grounds that the vocal dissenters are only a minute percentage of Army personnel and their views may not reflect those of the majority, or of even a sizeable minority. There is a danger in placing too much emphasis on a vocal minority. However, these are the views which are being broadcast and they are, to one degree or another, being put before all Army personnel. They raise questions which must be answered and, as such, ought to be of concern to the Command Information Program. There may well be other, unvoiced questions which are of greater significance. It is essential that they, too, be identified and answered. But until they are, it is important enough for the Army to address those issues which are known to exist.

The Army is not unique in experiencing dissent among its members today. American society, indeed the entire world, finds that dissent and protest against established methods and systems are a characteristic of the times, particularly among the youthful elements of society. Robert Ardrey recognizes the extent of dissent among today's youth and believes that it is a result of the reduced importance of the family in the period since the end of World War II. The decreased role of the family in his opinion has resulted in a greater emphasis on age-functional peer groups which are naturally antagonistic to the established authorities.⁴ Whatever the causes, it is important to bear in mind

⁴Robert Ardrey, The Social Contract (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 148-156.

that the Army's problems with dissent are, in part, related to similar problems in society at large.

The Army does, however, have some unique social problems resulting from its separation from the mainstream of American society and its interface with that society. Lieutenant Colonel Shirley Heinze has explored some of these problems in a thesis for the United States Army War College. Some of these problems are: the transient nature of the military family makes association with the civilian community difficult; the large number of civilian employees employed by the military possess values different from those of their military associates; the increasing demand for civilian-related skills in the Army tends to blur the traditional distinction between military and civilian values; and the continued influx of two year draftees reinforces the conflicts between the civilian and military communities.⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Heinze sums up the conflict between civilian and military ideals by stating that "to the extent that the Army does not adhere to society's dominant values, the fear of the public . . . are . . . more understandable."⁶ These problems, however, are those of the military in its relations with external society. Internally, they are primarily problems of concern to the military careerist. To understand

⁵Shirley R. Heinze (LTC, WAC), Societal Influence on the United States Army (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 3 March 1969), pp. 6-8.

⁶Ibid., p. 17.

the real problem of dissent within the Army, we must look elsewhere.

The Vietnam war is at the heart of much of the dissent. This is undoubtedly due to the role that the war has played in creating divisions in American society. It has served as a focal point for elements of our society who are dissatisfied with a part or all of the "system," and this attitude has influenced Army dissenters. Also, many of the organizations which have been active in opposition to the war, such as the ~~National Mobilization Committee~~ and the ~~American Friends Service Committee~~, have directed much of their protest activities toward the goal of influencing military personnel and have offered counseling and legal service to soldiers. But it would be unwise to over-emphasize the importance of the anti-war movement to the overall problem of dissent. Of six GI underground newspapers reviewed by the author, only two, the Huachuca Hard Times⁷ and The Ultimate Weapon⁸ devoted a significant amount of space to anti-war articles. The Ultimate Weapon on April 19, 1969 published a "statement of purpose" which was to "encourage all legal forms of opposition to the war in Vietnam."⁹ This position, however, appears to be the

⁷~~Huachuca Hard Times~~ (Fort Huachuca, Arizona), April 1969.

⁸~~The Ultimate Weapon~~ (Philadelphia), April 19, 1969.

⁹Ibid., p. 2.

exception rather than the rule; indeed, in the same statement of purpose, The Ultimate Weapon goes on to state that, in furtherance of the anti-war objective, it will explore "violations of common sense and human decency by brass and lifers."¹⁰ Anti-war sentiment has helped crystalize discontent and dissent within the Army but, of itself, it is directed against national policies and not against the military establishment.

The eight point program of the ~~American Serviceman's Union~~ offers an insight into some of the issues involved in GI dissent. The ASU was founded in 1967 and as of July, 1969 claimed a membership of 6,500.¹¹ The eight point program is listed below:¹²

1. An end to the saluting and sirring of officers.
2. Rank and file control over Court Martial Boards.
3. An end to racism in the Armed Forces.
4. Federal minimum wages for all enlisted men.
5. The right of GI's to collective bargaining.
6. The right of free political association.
7. The election of officers by enlisted men.
8. The right to disobey illegal and immoral orders.

With the exception of point number three, the program can be described generally as discontent with the "military system":

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Andy Stapp, Up Against the Brass (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 187.

¹²Ibid., pp. 89-91.

the military has its own ways of doing things and these ways are, to put it mildly, unacceptable to some military personnel. The third point, relating to racism in the military, is really a reflection of the race problem in American society. This is not to say that the Army does not have a race problem. Richard Harwood, in an article for The Washington Post recognizes the race issue as one of the Army's significant problems.¹³ And it is significant; according to Ward Just, junior officers at Fort Lewis, Washington believe that the "race thing" is far more significant than the "political agitation" which their superiors see as the major threat.¹⁴

The uniqueness of the racial problem is reflected in the rather limited and peripheral coverage it is afforded in the underground newspapers. Where it is considered, it is usually treated as a side issue to other, military-oriented problems. ~~The Rough Draft~~ of August 1969 had only one article related to racial problems: an Associated Press item on the fight of a negro family in Birmingham, Alabama to obtain a gravesite in a private cemetery for Bill Terry who was killed in Vietnam.¹⁵ With the exception of the ~~Quachuca Hard Times~~, the six underground newspapers

¹³Richard Harwood, The Washington Post, July 12, 1970, p. 1, col. 1.

¹⁴Ward Just, op. cit., p. 78.

¹⁵~~The Rough Draft~~ (Fort Eustis, Virginia), August 1969, p. 3.

reviewed for this paper give the overall impression that they are published by white soldiers. The Huachuca Hard Times is unique in this respect; it gives explicit support to "black power."¹⁶ The Hard Times has other unique features which will be explored below.

Although it is not properly a GI underground newspaper, Challenge, the voice of the Progressive Labor Party, devotes some space to military dissent, particularly as it can be identified with racial themes. A special issue, undated but apparently published in late 1969, outlines a program of GI dissenters. It leans heavily on the theme of racism and contains such phrases as "we must fight racism," "need black-white unity to win," and "racist harassment and punishment." The racist nature of the U.S. Armed Forces is "proven" by citing statistics relating to the relative high number of black soldiers who become casualties in Vietnam; the same methods are used to show that minority groups are given longer and harsher punishments under the system of military justice.¹⁷

An interesting variation on the racial theme is provided in The Daisy. In a letter reprinted from Harper's Magazine, a former GI, a white college graduate, explains why he refused to pursue commissioned officer status and, instead, served his three year obligation as an enlisted man.

¹⁶ Huachuca Hard Times (Fort Huachuca, Arizona), April 1969.

¹⁷ Challenge (Brooklyn: The Progressive Labor Party), undated.

He feels that service as an enlisted man is the only way that a middle class American white can approach the everyday experiences of black Americans. His advice to others who would follow this course is: "Stay out of the stockade, but barely. Obey the letter, but defy the spirit."¹⁸

Opposition to the "system" appears to be the major thrust of the dissent. It is difficult to catalogue all the irritants in military life which contribute to this issue. The ~~National Mobilization Committee~~, in a leaflet distributed to participants in "~~GI Week~~," in November 1968, summarized some of the attitudes:

The average GI . . . gets broken down emotionally and intellectually by a process known as HARASSMENT. The trainee is forced to buff floors that don't need buffing, scream instead of talk, run instead of walk, memorize meaningless lists, . . .

The GI's most immediate enemy, from basic on, is the noncommissioned officer . . . or lifer . . . The officer corps has its lifers too, but especially in Vietnam--it is made up mostly of college graduates. Sometimes generation ties replace caste ties . . .

Of course, the officers and NCO's pressure GI's constantly to stop thinking, to simply obey. But men have always overcome attempts to bully and blind them, and this is what American soldiers are doing, in rapidly increasing numbers, today.¹⁹

The underground GI newspapers are full of material dealing with dissatisfaction with the system. They cover the full spectrum of the eight point program of the American Serviceman's Union and reflect the view of the full range of

¹⁸ ~~The Daisy~~ (Dugway Proving Ground, Utah), Issue 2, undated.

¹⁹ Massimo Teodori, The New Left (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1969), pp. 315-316.

enlisted ranks in all the services. The Rough Draft, for example, prints a letter from a U.S. Navy seaman who voices the opinion that, "It is important that all military organizations be altered drastically . . . Man must be equal unto all other men . . . (all men) should always be free to speak and be heard."²⁰ An editorial in The Dawn concerns the same issue. In an appeal for support for dissent, the editorial asks, "If you believe in freedom of speech and all other freedoms rightfully due each man . . . then please let it be known."²¹ Similar sentiments are expressed in Shakedown,²² The Daisy, The Huachuca Hard Times, and The Ultimate Weapon.

The system of military justice is a frequent target of the dissenters. In underground newspapers this issue frequently takes the form of stories about soldiers who have been "victimized" by the court martial system, or, less frequently, those who have "beaten" the system. A favorite tactic is to advise readers of their rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and/or various army regulations. Of the six underground papers mentioned above, all but two (The Daisy and The Ultimate Weapon) contained such advice. This type of article covers the spectrum from a full page resume of twelve points to consider when faced with possible

²⁰~~The Rough Draft~~, op. cit., p. 2.

²¹~~The Dawn~~ (Fort Detrick, Maryland), April 1970, p. 5.

²²Shakedown, (Wrightstown, New Jersey), July 7, 1970.

legal proceedings,²³ to a summary of GI rights to participate in public demonstration.²⁴

Recently, the system of military justice has been brought into the focus of public scrutiny. This is partially a result of the publicity resulting from the court-martial of anti-war dissenters, and partially from the trial of military personnel accused of war crimes. Another, important factor in bringing attention to the system is the book by Robert Sherrill, Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music.²⁵ In this admittedly non-detached examination, Mr. Sherrill describes many of the challenges to the system which are coming " . . . not from the Congress . . . nor from the U.S. Supreme Court . . . (but) from many of the conscript servicemen themselves and from their militant attorneys."²⁶ The most significant of these challenges are described below.

Using the various courts martial which resulted from the "Presidio mutiny" as a vehicle, Mr. Sherrill charges that the "system" is "racked by the most arbitrary gusts of emotion and self-interest."²⁷ The basis for this charge is

²³Ibid., p. 8.

²⁴~~Huachuca Hard Times~~, op. cit., p. 4.

²⁵Robert Sherrill, Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music (New York: Harper and Row, 1970)

²⁶Ibid., p. 2.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 61.

that, while the earlier courts trying some of the accused adjudged sentences up to sixteen years, later courts, convened after the force of public opinion had been felt, and in which the accused were tried for the same act performed at the same time and place, adjudged sentences of only three to fifteen months.

In an attack on the basic premises of the system of military justice,²⁸ that it exists not to promote justice but to achieve "at all costs, discipline," Mr. Sherrill finds many flaws: the absence of bail, no indictment by grand jury, no impartial judge and lack of due process. He acknowledges the many attempts to reform the system but claims the following defects still exist in spite of reform: vagueness of law, command influence, the stacked jury, and obstacles to the proper conduct of the defense. Further, beyond the courts-martial, the military has another means of punishing the dissidents--administrative separation--which avoids even the minimal protection afforded the accused by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Mr. Sherrill believes that the injustices of the system are so great that they can be cured only by dismembering the system itself and placing military personnel accused of offenses under the jurisdiction of civilian courts (he would allow the military to retain its Article 15 jurisdiction). He believes that essential reform will

²⁸Ibid., pp. 62-97.

come about, not from within the military nor from Congress, but from the pressure of an outraged public.²⁹

The preceding paragraphs have, I believe, served to identify, in general terms, the issues involved in dissent within the Army. They have not attempted to judge the validity of those issues, nor to determine the extent of the dissent. As stated at the start of this chapter, that was not the purpose. In the next chapter I will review the Army's Command Information Program to determine how effectively the Army is attempting to explain its position on the issues.

Before closing this discussion, however, I would like to make a few comments about underground, GI newspapers. They are, apparently, a fairly widespread phenomenon.

The Ultimate Weapon of April 1969 published a list of eighteen GI newspapers (See Appendix) which did not include The Pawe, The Daisy, or the Huachuca Hard Times.³⁰ The list covers a wide geographical area and indicates that underground papers are, or have been, published at most Army posts. (The Ultimate Weapon and Shakedown ceased publication in late 1969 and 1970, respectively.)³¹

²⁹Ibid., pp. 224-225.

³⁰The Ultimate Weapon op. cit., p. 7.

³¹Letter, Headquarters, Fort Dix, New Jersey, AHBOGB, Subject: Request of Underground Newspapers for Analysis, 29 January 1971.

The six newspapers considered in this analysis were provided by the Office of the Chief of Information, Headquarters, Department of the Army, and the Director of Security, Fort Dix, New Jersey. With two exceptions, they are well written, literate, and present their positions in a rational and tasteful manner; the two exceptions are the ~~Pinchot Hard Times~~ and ~~Shakedown~~. These publications make frequent use of profanity and of offensive slogans, caricatures and cartoons. Surprisingly, these two represent the extremes of technical sophistication of the six newspapers: Shakedown is the most professional from the standpoint of layout, design, and printing technique, and uses numerous photographs; the ~~Pinchot Hard Times~~ is mimeographed and the only illustrations are line drawings. The significance of these extremes, indeed of the entire phenomenon of GI underground papers, awaits the scrutiny of further research. I will only suggest here that the difference in the papers and their overall serious approach, dictates against hasty generalizations as to their impact and influence.

Chapter 4

THE ANSWERS

Naturally you want to excel at leading troops.
But do your troops want you to excel at leading them?
This is the same thing as asking--
Do they want to excel as soldiers?
Making soldiers answer yes to both of these questions
is really what Command Information is all about.¹

The Army has several options available in dealing with the problems of dissent outlined in the previous chapter: where the action is clearly illegal or in violation of regulations, disciplinary action may be initiated; action may be taken to eliminate the cause of the dissatisfaction; or, the Army can attempt to explain to the soldier the reason for the existence of certain unpopular conditions and to tell him what the Army is doing to soften or alleviate their impact. This last option, plus publicizing actions to eliminate the causes of dissatisfaction is the concern of the Command Information Program and will be the chief concern of this chapter. Before getting into the Command Information Program's response to the issues, however, I would like to cover briefly the first two options.

Disciplinary action is a possible response by commanders to dissident activity, particularly when it appears that such activity is adversely affecting the efficiency of

¹Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA PAM 360-801, Commanders Call, 3d Quarter Fy 70.

their commands. In 1969 the Department of Defense published guidelines for commanders confronted with dissident and protest activities.² While these guidelines take notice of certain rights to dissent, their major thrust, in my opinion, is toward the right of commanders to take legal action to prohibit or punish dissident activities. In regard to underground newspapers, the guidelines recognize the rights of military personnel to publish such papers on their own time and with their own resources. They may, however, be punished for such action when their publications "contain language the utterance of which is punishable under Federal law."³

In the area of eliminating irritants of military life which contribute to dissent, the Army has taken several actions, primarily in support of the goal of an all volunteer Army. Some of these actions were directed by a message from the Chief of Staff of the Army in December 1970.⁴ They include: elimination of reveille formations; liberalization of pass policies requiring sign-in and sign-out, bed-checks, and distance restrictions; more effective communications between superiors and subordinates; and relaxed regulations on consumption of alcoholic beverages. Many other actions, on a command-wide and/or local basis are being tested to determine their impact on discipline and morale. These

²Department of Defense, Directive 1325.6, 12 September 1969.

³Ibid.

⁴Department of the Army, Message, Subject: Army Action to Improve Service Attractiveness, 9 December 1970.

activities, such as improved living conditions, elimination of KP, and relaxed regulations on haircuts are reported regularly in the popular news media.

It is not the intent of this paper to examine the efficacy of the Army's reactions to dissent, whether they be increased discipline or greater leniency. Indeed, if we are to believe Ward Just, "the Army doesn't know what to do about (dissent)."⁵ What is of concern here is the Army's efforts to explain to its members the actions which it has taken to alleviate irritants and the rationale for the existence of certain practices and conditions which, although disliked by the rank and file, are considered essential to the efficient operation of the Army. In other words, what are the Army's answers to the questions raised by its members?

As described in the first chapter, the Command Information Program is the Army's formalized means of presenting to its members the official position on matters which concern them. Historically it has performed this function with varying degrees of success and with greater or lesser emphasis from Headquarters, Department of the Army. The program still has this objective. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to explore the way in which the program has answered the challenge of increasing dissent in today's Army.

⁵Ward Just, op. cit., p. 78.

The need for a constant flow of information to the members of the Army today is perhaps best expressed in the words of Major General George S. Blanchard, Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division. In discussing the problem of dissent, and the questions raised by today's soldiers, General Blanchard stated that the GI has "a right to ask why he is here, doing what he is doing. Sometimes the answer has to be 'because that's the way it's got to be.' But his right to ask and his understanding of why makes him a tremendously more valuable fighting man . . ."⁶ These words pretty well sum-up the role of the Command Information in meeting the problem of dissent.

The basic guidance for the conduct of the Command Information Program is contained in Army Regulation 360-81, Command Information: Program Objectives and Policies, Publications, and Armed Forces Radio and Television. Published in April of 1970, this regulation is a development from its predecessors discussed in the second chapter. It is also a reflection, in some respects, of the recommendations of the Smith Report. A knowledge of this regulation is essential for understanding the program's response to questions of dissent. Key provisions of the regulation are described below.

The objective of Command Information to increase the effectiveness of the Army can be sub-divided into four categories: reinforcing the principles of democracy and freedom

⁶The National Observer, April 26, 1971, p. 22.

inherent in the American Heritage; informing of the nature of communist and other external threats to the United States and the Free World; explaining the role of the military, specifically the Army, as the protector of our way of life; and advising Army personnel of laws, policies, regulations and actions which affect their personal and professional interests.⁷ These objectives are directed at all of the Army's internal publics: active duty personnel, retired members, dependents, members of the reserve forces, and civilian employees. The first two of these objectives are dependent, primarily, upon reinforcing attitudes which soldiers have formed prior to their entrance into military service; the Army can hardly expect to instill these attitudes if they do not already exist as a result of family background and civilian education. The same is also true, but to a lesser extent, of the third objective. It is the fourth objective, explaining policies and practices which affect the soldier, which concerns this paper and it is the objective which the Army can most realistically hope to attain. This is not to say that the other three objectives are not pertinent to the problem of dissent; they are. In fact, there is a great deal of overlap in these objectives and the elements of one can be useful in the accomplishment of another. Thus, the traditions of democracy in America can be used to illustrate the reasons for certain features of the Uniform Code of Military Justice;

⁷Department of the Army, AR 360-81, 17 April 1970, pp. 1-1, 1-2.

or, the nature of the threat of communism can help to explain the need for specific restraints imposed on military personnel under certain conditions. To this extent, the four categories of objectives cannot be considered independently. Still, it is the fourth category in which the questions of dissent must be answered.

Army Regulation 360-81 outlines the responsibilities for conducting the Command Information Program.⁸ At Department of the Army level, the Chief of Information is responsible for policy and guidance, implementing Department of Defense directives, producing support materials, and evaluating the overall effectiveness of the program. Major subordinate commanders and Army component commanders of unified commands are responsible for implementing, supervising, inspecting and evaluating the program within their commands. Commanders at all echelons are responsible for establishing, operating and supervising the program within their commands.

The Continental Army Command (CONARC) has published a supplement to AR 260-81 which provides further guidance for the conduct of the Command Information Program by units within the continental United States.⁹ This supplement includes additional hours of instruction and amplification of Department of the Army requirements for Command Information topics to be covered during basic and advanced individual training. It also delineates the responsibility at CONARC

⁸Ibid., pp. 1-2, 1-3.

⁹Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command, Supplement 1 to AR 360-81, 30 October 1970.

Headquarters for additional materials to be produced in support of various aspects of the program. The CONARC supplement is beyond the scope of this paper. It is mentioned only to show that major commanders may influence the implementation of the program by adding requirements in areas where they feel more emphasis is needed.

In the Infantry division, the Information Officer is the special staff officer with the responsibility for implementing the Command Information Program. By Table of Organization and Equipment, this position is authorized to be filled by an officer in the grade of Major. The division information section consists of: two Captains, Assistant Information Officers; a Sergeant, E-8, Information Supervisor; a Senior Information Specialist, grade E-5; a Broadcast Specialist, grade E-4; and two E-4 Information Specialists.¹⁰ In addition to the Command Information Program, the Information Officer and his section are also responsible for the Public Information and Community Relations Program.

The conduct of the Command Information Program is basically the responsibility of the company-level commander. He is advised in AR 360-81 of the various means which he has at his disposal to implement the program (e.g., personal contact, pamphlets, posters, and unit newspapers); however, the keystone of the program at the unit level is a weekly period of formal instruction called Commanders Call. The

¹⁰Department of the Army, Table of Organization and Equipment 7-4H, 30 November 1970, p. 9.

regulation offers only general guidance for the conduct of this instruction: it need not be confined to one subject; participation by all unit personnel, including officers, is required; discussions will not take the form of an attack on American principles or advocate ideologies or governments hostile to the interests of the United States; policies of the government may be discussed but only with the understanding that the soldier has a clear responsibility to abide by those policies.

The basic guidance for conducting the Commanders Call Program is provided in Department of the Army Pamphlets of the 360-800 series. These pamphlets, entitled "Commanders Call" are published quarterly and outline, with support materials, the program to be conducted for the three month period which they cover. During 1970, three of these pamphlets were published and distributed. None was produced for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1970.

The pamphlets are designed for use at the company level. Each one consists of six sections: Guidance for Commanders, Troop Topics, Officers Call, Supplementary Materials, Command Information Materials Exchange, and Visual Aids. The Troop Topic section is of primary concern here since it contains the material recommended for presentation to the enlisted soldiers. However, the other sections do have an impact on this aspect of the program, so I will briefly describe their purposes.

Guidance for Commanders normally contains general information as to techniques to be used in the conduct of

the Commanders Call period, the broad aims or objectives of the program for the quarter, and a listing of future topics and materials to be published. There is frequently a reminder to the unit commander as to the importance of the program and of his responsibilities in the program. For example, the pamphlet for the third quarter of fiscal year 1970 contained the following appeal: "You are the critical link in the chain, for it is at the company-troop-battery level that the information from all the other levels either hits or misses its ultimate target--the minds and hearts of soldiers."¹¹

Section Three, Officers' Call, contains the materials to be presented (formal presentation or required readings) to the officers of the command during the quarter. These materials are usually written in a more sophisticated style than those designed for the enlisted soldier and cover a greater variety of, and more controversial topics. (e.g., Vietnam Tactics, Race Relations, and Military Justice). Although there is no formal requirement to do so, Commanders Call sometimes recommends that Officers' Call materials be presented to the troops; such a recommendation was made relative to the third quarter fiscal year 1970 materials on military justice.¹²

The Supplementary Materials, Section IV, consists of speeches and addresses of prominent military and civilian government officials relating to command information objec-

¹¹DA PAM 360-81, op. cit., p. 3.

¹²Ibid.

tives; memorandums from Department of Defense officials; and selected Command Information Fact Sheets. The second quarter fiscal year 1971 pamphlet reprinted Command Information Fact Sheet No. 165, 22 May 1970, Subject: Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities among Members of the Armed Forces. There is no formal requirement for the further dissemination or use of these supplemental materials other than the general guidance that, "all unit officers should be afforded the opportunity to read these statements . . ."¹³

Section V lists command information materials produced by Defense agencies, Department of the Army, and major Army commands which are available for use by commanders. Suggested references for outside readings on selected topics (e.g. drug abuse) are also included. In those instances where the materials are outside of normal requisitioning channels, addresses are provided.

The Visual Aids sections contain a variety of materials designed to assist the commander in presenting the program. These materials include: topic outlines to be reproduced in larger form to be used in formal classroom presentations; illustrated posters which can be used to generate interest prior to periods of instruction and also to assist in the formal presentation; and line drawing illustrations of color slides which are available through local Audio-Visual Support Centers. In both the third

¹³Ibid., p. 4.

quarter fiscal year 1970 and the second quarter fiscal year 1971 Visual Aids sections, questionnaires were included for the purpose of assisting evaluation of the effectiveness of the materials.

Before moving on to the subject matter covered in the Troop Topics section of Commanders' Call, one point should be emphasized: Department of the Army does not prescribe mandatory coverage of any of the subjects included in the pamphlet. There is apparently a fairly widespread misconception among Army officers that these subjects constitute a mandatory requirement. In a paper written for the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Major David C. Blakeley found that forty percent of the officers he surveyed (students at the college) felt that the commanders was not given sufficient leeway to present subjects of his own choosing.¹⁴ This may be due to requirements imposed by intermediate headquarters; it is not a result of Department of the Army requirements. DA Pamphlet 360-802 is very specific about this and emphasizes that the Commanders' Call period "is time that belongs to the commander and his men to discuss problems and issues that affect them as a unit and as individuals."¹⁵

¹⁴David C. Blakeley, Role of the Commander in Developing an Effective Command Information Program, (unpublished treatise, Fort Leavenworth: United States Army Command and General Staff College, April 1971), p. 3.

¹⁵Department of the Army, DA PAM 360-802, Commanders' Call 1st Quarter Fiscal Year 1971, p. 3.

The Troop Topics section of Commanders' Call contains narrative materials designed to be used in support of classroom presentations. They are also presented in outline form (in addition to some of the Visual Aids described above) but are primarily intended to serve as reference material for the unit commander in preparing his lesson plans. In the following paragraphs I will describe the content of Troop Topics published for calendar year 1970.

"Our Other Mission" is the title of the first Troop Topic for 1970. It describes the peacetime accomplishments of the United States Army, from the Lewis and Clark expedition of 1804 to the public works projects performed by the Corps of Engineers today. Emphasized is the contribution which the Army has made and is making to the overall betterment of American society. Benefits to the individual soldier, such as those accruing from Project Transition, are also covered. This topic does serve to assist the unit commander in answering some of the questions involved on dissent: it gives him concrete examples of the Army's contributions to society and enables him to relate some of the benefits available to the individual soldier.

The second topic of 1970, "Status of Forces Agreements," also can be related to the question of dissent--but only in regards to soldiers serving or programmed for assignment overseas. It outlines the rights and protections guaranteed to U.S. servicemen serving in foreign areas. This area, however, is outside the scope of this paper.

"Army Research and Development" is another topic for use in Commanders' Call. This subject covers the Army's organization for R & D and lists some of the projects under development or recently completed. The thrust is "R & D helps us keep the peace by keeping us prepared for war."¹⁶ There is no direct relationship between this subject and dissent.

The fourth topic in 1970 dealt with preparing the soldier for a future career. "Your Highway to the Future" can be best described as a vocational counselling session. It covers the preparation necessary for the serviceman to undergo whether he intends to remain in the Army or return to civilian life. The benefits of Project Transition and the G.I. Bill are explained in detail. While this type of information does not relate directly to dissent it does contribute to a solution by directing the soldiers' attention toward the attainment of positive individual goals.

"You and the Army Reserve" is the fifth topic for the year. It defines the missions and functions of the Army Reserve and explains the reserve commitment imposed on soldiers who will separate from the Army with less than six years active duty. This subject does not address any of the problems of dissent.

The sixth topic for 1970, "Soldiers and Money" advises the soldier on the management of his financial affairs. It

¹⁶DA PAM 360-801, op. cit., p. 33.

covers such subjects as credit, borrowing, advantages of the Post Exchange, and insurance. It also exposes some of the more common frauds and rackets directed at military personnel. It relates to the problem of dissent only indirectly, in the same manner in which "Your Highway to the Future" does. A related subject is presented as the last topic for the year. "Soldiers and Credit Cards" argues the pros and cons of credit card use and gives the soldier a list of actions he should take to protect himself.

The first topic for the last quarter of 1970 is "SAEDA-Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army," a topic more appropriate to intelligence or counter-intelligence instruction than to the Command Information Program. Perhaps it can be related to the command information objective of keeping military personnel informed of the nature of the communist threat; or perhaps it is directed at the actions of the more militant of the dissenters in the Army.

The eighth and ninth topics for 1970, "Pride of a Pro" and "The Enlisted Promotion System" are designed primarily for the career soldier. The first, however, does direct some significant information at the two year inductee: it points out that the American soldier is expected to think and act on his own initiative and to understand and accept the need for military discipline. This is really at the heart of much of the dissident activity discussed in the previous chapter. In discussing the qualities of a "real pro" this subject concentrates on four: courage, loyalty,

the habit of being right, and the fighting spirit.¹⁷ Each of these qualities is considered in light of the advantages they afford to the individual and his unit or the Army as a whole. It is difficult to assess the impact of a topic of this nature and I will not attempt to; it is sufficient to say that it is an attempt to counter some of the attitudes which contribute to dissent. The same is also true of "The Enlisted Promotion System:" by providing the soldier with an understanding of how the promotion system works, this subject can head-off possible areas of dissent.

Of the nine topics presented for 1970, then, two can be identified as having no impact on the problem of dissent ("Army Research and Development," and "You and the Army Reserve"); one topic ("Status of Forces Agreements") is related only to soldiers assigned overseas; the remaining topics do not address any of the areas of dissent identified in Chapter 3 but do make an indirect contribution to the commander's efforts to deal with that problem.

The Department of the Army produces several other publications and other materials in support of the Command Information Program. Fact Sheets are published on an as-needed basis to "expand in announced policy of direct interest to Army personnel." Also published on an as-needed basis are posters reflecting current emphasis on certain

¹⁷Department of the Army, DA PAM 360-83, Commanders' Call, 2nd Quarter Fiscal Year 1971, p. 10.

issues. Army News Features consists of weekly news features and photographs and monthly art features of news items of a military nature designed for use by local command newspapers and magazines. Speechmaker Kits and the Speech File Service are prepared primarily for oral presentation but could be used in printed media. Other material is prepared for use by the electronic media, both American Forces Radio and Television, and commercial stations. Two of these electronic features, The Big Picture and Army Reports are suitable for use with the Commanders' Call program.

Army Digest is the official Army magazine. It is published monthly "to provide timely and authoritative information on policies, plans, operations, and technical developments of the Army,"¹⁸ and "to provide timely factual information of professional interest to members of the United States Army."¹⁹ The recommended distribution formula for Army Digest is one per officer and one per ten enlisted members.²⁰ Recent issues have been published in 250,000 copies.²¹ The nature of this magazine and its wide distribution make it an ideal vehicle for answering the questions of dissent.

¹⁸AR 360-81, op. cit., p. 1-9.

¹⁹Army Digest, April 1971, p. 2.

²⁰AR 360-81, op. cit., p. 1-9.

²¹Telephone conversation between the author and the Office of the Chief of Information, 28 April 1971.

Army Digest is well written and produced; it makes excellent use of photographs, drawings and humor to gain the reader's attention. A typical issue consists of two features, "AD Dateline" and "What's New" which are capsule comments on new developments in policy and technology; a page of cartoons on military themes; and an average of twenty feature articles. The inside front cover for each issue is devoted to a short item on aspects of American military history. The inside back cover is a pin-up picture.

In order to assess the coverage devoted to the issues of dissent, I reviewed the twelve Army Digest issues published in 1970 and established six broad categories in which the feature articles could be classified: service benefits, American history and military heritage, Army units and skills, Reserve and National Guard forces, Vietnam, and issues of dissent. I then classified each of the 247 feature articles of 1970 into one of these six categories. Obviously, there are some articles which did not fit clearly into any category; in these instances, and they were relatively few, I had to arbitrarily assign them to one of the identified categories in which they most closely fit. Where there was an overlap between categories I assigned the article to the category which received the greater emphasis in the article. In every case where the article could be related to the issues of dissent, I assigned it to that category. For example, two articles on personnel assignment policies (July and September issues) could have been assigned

to either the service benefits, military units and skills, or issues categories; I assigned them to the issues category on the basis that, by helping to explain assignment policies these articles help eliminate sources of dissatisfaction. This practice was followed throughout my analysis in order to give the benefit of the doubt to any article possibly related to dissent.

The results of my analysis are shown at Table 1. These data reveal some fairly obvious facts about the content of Army Digest. First, and most pertinent to the subject of this paper, is the relatively minor number of articles devoted to the issues of dissent: only 20 out of 247, or 8% of the total content. This is the second smallest of the six categories, with only Reserve and National Guard receiving less coverage. Of the twenty articles in this category, five were on some aspect of the military justice problem; two were concerned with racial problems; two covered methods of improving communications between superiors and subordinates; and the remainder were devoted to topics which are only indirectly related to the problems of dissent (e.g. personnel assignment policies and the enlisted promotion system).

The second noticeable characteristic is the large percentage of articles in the category of Military Units and Skills. The criteria for placing articles in this category was admittedly quite general: unit activities, training, foreign military units, and any other topic relating to the military which did not fit into another category, were the

Table 1

ARMY DIGEST ARTICLES BY CATEGORY

Category	Number of Articles	Percent of Total
Benefits of Service	43	18
American/Military Heritage	44	18
Military Units/Skills	102	41
Reserve and National Guard	13	5
Vietnam	25	10
Issues of Dissent	20	8
Totals	247	100

types of articles included here. Still, it would appear that, in relation to the other categories, an excessive amount of space is devoted to this general subject.

Army Digest is not so overwhelmingly one-sided as it might initially appear, however; a few words about the other two large categories will serve to illustrate this. Benefits of the Service and American/Military Traditions together account for over one third of the total articles. These two categories do contribute indirectly to answering the questions of dissent: the first, by reminding the soldier of what he has to gain from his military service, helps eliminate some of the sources of dissatisfaction; the second, by its appeals to patriotism and pride in service, helps the soldier to understand the necessity for his service and makes it more meaningful. With these facts in mind, it is apparent that the overall content is more balanced than a cursory view indicates.

In 1969, Lieutenant Colonel V. J. Smith, in a thesis for the Command and General Staff College analyzed the readability of three army magazines.²² In regards to Army Digest, LTC Smith found that "the readability of Army Digest . . . (is) . . . suitable for its target audience in most respects." This conclusion was based on a mean grade level, based on the Fogg Readability Index, of 9.62 for articles

²²V. J. Smith, An Analysis of the Readability of Three Army Magazines, (unpublished thesis, Fort Leavenworth: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1969).

appearing in the magazine. He did find, however, that Army Digest violated some of the precepts of targeting the material for the intended audience and recommended that the staff of the Army Digest use established readability formulas in preparing the magazine.²³

Within the Office of the Chief of Information the majority of command information functions are performed by the Command Information Division. The division has three branches: the Plans Branch performs short-range planning; the Training Materials Branch produces pamphlets, fact sheets and other printed materials; and the Informational Services Branch monitors Army command information newspapers and command-wide newspapers (e.g. Stars and Stripes) as well as the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service. The Army Digest staff is assigned to a separate activity, the Command Information Unit, for administrative and logistical support; the Command Information Unit operates under the staff supervision of the Command Information Division and operational matters concerning Army Digest are within the purview of the division.²⁴

The Office of Information for the Armed Forces, Department of Defense publishes common-use support materials in the areas of democracy and citizenship, communism, world affairs, forces for freedom, code of conduct, area orienta-

²³Ibid., pp. 48-51.

²⁴The Smith Report, op. cit., pp. IV-J-6 and VIII-13.

tion, and personal affairs.²⁵ It produces films (Armed Forces Military Report) which are designed for showing in post theatres but which are available for use in the Commanders' Call Program. Printed media support materials include the following: Commanders Digest, which covers world affairs and other items and which is distributed to unit commanders down to company level; pamphlets, posters, and fact sheets on issues which are a Department of Defense responsibility; the American Forces Press File, which provides news and features for use in unit newspapers; and Pocket Guides for countries in which American military personnel are assigned. These publications are available for the use of unit commanders in preparing their Command Information Program.

At this point it is appropriate to look again at the recommendations of the Smith Report which were listed in Chapter 2 to see to what extent they have been incorporated into the current Command Information Program. It should be noted that the implementation of these recommendations is difficult to quantify and to a great extent, their implementation is a subjective determination. Still, there are some indicators which will allow us to make such a determination.

The Smith Committee recommended that the Command Information Program be given greater "command interest." It is impossible to measure command interest by any other means than a sampling of the opinions and attitudes of commanders.

²⁵AR 360-81, op. cit., p. 1-8.

As far as I have been able to determine, no such sampling has been attempted at the Department of the Army or major command level. The Office of the Chief of Information has, however, taken action to generate such interest among unit commanders. This has been accomplished through the use of the "Commanders' Call" pamphlets described above. These pamphlets, first published in 1969, are a significant improvement to the program. They emphasize that command information is a tool to help the commander solve his local problems and they try to provide him the materials he needs to cover these problems. Although, as I have noted, the pamphlets have not adequately covered all the problems, they do, I think, help to arouse the interest of the commander in the program.

The committee's recommendation that the Command Information Program be more responsive to the needs of all internal publics has been implemented through guidelines to post commanders issued by the Chief of Information. These guidelines, first proposed in 1970 and tested in early 1971, urge the "modernization" of post newspapers so that they are used "as a primary means of communicating regularly with their young soldiers and junior officers . . . (and) . . . should examine their format and style and content to insure that they generate maximum reader interest . . ."²⁶

²⁶Army Times, 11 August 1971, p. 10.

The Smith Committee also noted that there was a shortage of qualified information officers to fill requirements. In 1969 the Office of the Chief of Information initiated a stepped-up program to recruit officers into the Information Officer Specialist Program. I do not know what results have been achieved by this program, but it is an indication that OCINFO is aware of the problem and is taking steps to remedy it.

The recommendation of the committee that more instruction on the information program be provided at Army service and staff schools has been implemented. The current Army regulation on the Command Information Program specifies that the subject is to be included in the programs of instruction at those schools.²⁷

The recommendation that more efficient procedures for the review, analysis and evaluation of command information materials be initiated has not been fully implemented. However, as an interim measure, an individual at OCINFO level has been designated to perform this function until a permanent procedure has been established.²⁸

²⁷AR 360-81, 17 April 1970, op. cit., pp. 1-6 and 1-7.

²⁸Telephone conversation between the author and OCINFO, 15 March, 1971.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS

Findings based on the study of the Command Information Program's answers to the issues of dissent can be divided into three categories: objectives and policies, organization, and media. These categories are covered in separate sections below. A final summary on the program's coverage of the problems of dissent concludes this chapter. Areas of suggested further research are indicated in the appropriate sections.

OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES

The basic objective of the Command Information Program has not changed since the period immediately following World War II. In 1949 this objective was stated as to assist commanders in obtaining from their subordinates "intelligent, cooperative, and loyal effort toward the accomplishment of any mission."¹ In 1970 this objective was worded, "to increase the effectiveness of the Army by providing information to improve understanding of the Army and to motivate each individual to perform to the limit of his ability."² In both years the stress in accomplishing the stated objective has

¹AR 355-5, 11 May 1949, op. cit., p. 1.

²AR 360-81, 17 April 1970, op. cit., p. 1-1.

been placed on reinforcing responsibility as a citizen and dedication to traditional American values.

In 1949 the Army was dealing with young soldiers who had spent their most formative years during World War II--a period of intense patriotism during which traditional American values were held in high esteem. In 1970, the younger soldier had a much greater tendency to question those basic values and would be expected to be less responsive to a program based on those values. The objectives of the Command Information Program have failed to respond to the changing attitudes of its audience. Since the program is so dependent on these attitudes it is critical for the Department of the Army to determine just what these attitudes are among today's soldiers and to revise its objectives accordingly. It is entirely possible that the Army, rather than reinforcing existing attitudes, will have to take a more positive role in initiating and developing attitudes. This function of "citizenship training" is one of the three major functions of armies recognized by John Steward Ambler in his study of the French Army in politics.³

Before the Army could increase its activities in the area of citizenship training, however, it would be necessary to reach some sort of accommodation with the Congress as to its proper function. Perhaps the assistance of the Congress could be solicited in developing such a program. In any

³John Steward Ambler, Soldiers Against the State: The French Army in Politics, (Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday and Co., 1968), p. 1X.

event, cooperation between the Army and the Congress along these lines would help to eliminate possible objections to what might be considered political indoctrination by the military. Such criticism was voiced in a 1961 study prepared for Senator Fulbright by the staff of the Senate Armed Forces Committee.⁴ The fact that the Senate Armed Forces Committee provided recommendations for the conduct of troop information in 1962,⁵ following Senator Fulbright's criticism, indicates that the Congress might be willing to cooperate with the Army in developing such a program.

Another area requiring additional research is the overlap between the Command Information Program and other programs designed to accomplish similar objectives. Specifically, the Character Guidance Program and the Code of Conduct both attempt to reinforce or instill certain moral values in the soldier. To what extent they complement the Command Information Program, or possibly detract from it, is a question that should be answered by the Army if the three programs are to obtain maximum effectiveness.

The policy from Department of the Army that Commanders' Call periods of instruction be conducted in small groups to facilitate discussion, which appeared in the early regulations is not included in the current regulation. Conceivably this could and does result in Commanders' Call being presented

⁴Cabell Phillips, The New York Times, July 21, 1961, p. 1, col. 2.

⁵U.S. Congress, Senate, op. cit., p. 1315.

to the troops in the form of lectures rather than in discussions with a resultant loss of effectiveness. Further research in this area would be helpful in establishing the relative effectiveness of small group discussions versus lectures and whether or not the earlier policy ought to be reimplemented.

ORGANIZATION

The major change in the Office of the Chief of Information since World War II has been the elimination of the Research Branch. Current organization does not specify a specific branch or division to perform the research and evaluation function. The Smith Report has recognized this as a deficiency.⁶ Hopefully it will be corrected in the near future. The inclusion of an independent research and evaluation element within OCINFO would provide the capability for attitude research among the target audience and allow for a more precise and definitive statement of program objectives and an analysis of the effectiveness of the program media.

The Command Information Program does have access to and makes use of sample surveys prepared by other Department of the Army agencies. For example, a February 1971 survey from the Chief of Personnel Operations included three questions relating to Army Digest which attempted to survey the preferences for types of material to be included in the

⁶The Smith Report, op. cit., ch. VII.

magazine.⁷ While this approach is helpful, it does not come close to satisfying the requirement for research and analysis. The successes recorded by the Research Branch during World War II argue for a similar element within the current organization of OCINFO.

MEDIA

The two media of concern to this study. Commanders' Call and Army Digest are, by nature of their widespread distribution, potentially effective for providing answers to the issues of dissent. Their content, however, has in large measure failed to address these issues to any significant degree. This failure may be partially due to the inadequacy of the program's objectives as described above as well as to the lack of a research capability to identify the issues of concern to today's soldiers.

Commanders' Call, because of its nature as optional material to be presented or not presented to the troops depending on the desires of the local commander, should provide a wide range of subject matter so that the commander has some flexibility in selecting subjects appropriate to his particular command. Yet this publication provided an average of only three subjects for each quarter for which it was published. Even if a commander were to select all three of these subjects for presentation he would still find

⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Memo From the Chief of Personnel Operations, Subject: Quarterly Sample Survey of Military Personnel, 28 February 1971.

himself with nine or ten mandatory periods of Commanders' Call for which no reference materials are provided. While the Army can and should expect commanders to use their initiative in developing their own presentations, it would seem that greater support could be provided from the Department of the Army. In addition to increasing the volume of reference materials available to the commander, Commanders' Call should attempt to provide more materials directly related to the issues of dissent; the fact that none of the nine topics presented in 1970 addressed these issues directly indicates that the priorities for these materials need to be reexamined. This is not to say that the topics presented in 1970 were not relevant and useful to most commanders: they appear to be so. But a larger number of topics covering a wide range of subject matter, and addressing at least some of the issues of dissent would greatly assist the local commander in answering the questions his troops are asking.

Much of the same criticism can be levelled against Army Digest: the balance of articles by category as shown in Chapter 4 indicates a failure to respond to the issues of dissent. Certainly, too much coverage has been given to the subjects categorized under the heading "Military Units and Skills." The large percentage of articles devoted to service benefits probably contributes indirectly to answering problems of dissent; the effectiveness of articles on American and military heritage is more questionable, and cannot be properly assessed until the attitudes of today's soldiers

toward traditional values are measured.

Army Digest and Commanders' Call could perhaps improve their coverage of the issues of dissent by reprinting articles which appear in other publications. For example, answers to many of the questions raised about the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and about some of the administrative restrictions imposed on military personnel were presented in an article by Major Michael A. Brown in the January edition of the Military Law Review.⁸ This article, and others of a similar nature, could be reprinted in the command information media or distributed to unit commanders through information channels to provide additional coverage of the issues of dissent.

SUMMARY

Today's soldier is much more likely than his counterpart of twenty years ago to question the Army's way of doing things; he is particularly concerned with the system of military justice, harassment, and racial problems. And he is vocal in his dissent as is testified to by the issues raised in underground GI newspapers. Increasingly the commander must be prepared to answer the questions raised by dissidents within his command, and to answer them with factual, reasonable information.

⁸Michael A. Brown, "Must the Soldier Be a Silent Member of Our Society?", Military Law Review, Vol. 43, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 January 1969).

The Command Information Program is the basis for the Army's answers to the questions of dissent. Yet the program is based primarily on objectives which were valid during World War II and which have not been adequately tested against the ideas and attitudes of today's soldiers. And the Office of the Chief of Information is not now organized to perform the type of research and evaluation necessary to determine the adequacy of these objectives and the implementing media. The two media which have the widest distribution to the soldier, Commanders' Call and Army Digest have made attempts to answer some of the questions, but on such a small scale that their impact on dissent is suspect.

Department of the Army is aware of the shortcomings of its Command Information Program and is considering recommendations to improve the program. The most pressing need is to discover the issues which concern the soldier and to present to him the official Army position on these issues in such a manner as to increase his motivation to be a good soldier. Increased emphasis on the issues in Commanders' Call and Army Digest would materially assist the unit commander in solving his information problem.

Appendix

UNDERGROUND NEWSPAPERS

(The following list of underground newspapers was printed in The Ultimate Weapon, April 19, 1969. As noted in the text, some of these publications may have ceased publication at the time of the writing of this thesis.)

~~Top Secret (Ft Devens)~~
P.O. Box 513
Cambridge, Mass. 02139

~~Head On (Camp LeJune)~~
P.O. Box 879
Jacksonville, N.C. 28540

~~Veterans' Stars & Stripes
for Peace~~
P.O. Box 4598
Chicago, Ill. 60680

~~GI Voice~~
Box 825, Stuyvestant Station
New York, N. Y. 10009

~~Rough Draft~~
c/o Dennis Ciesielski
1318 W. 40th St.
Norfolk, Va. 23508

~~Gig-Line (Ft Bliss)~~
Address not yet available

~~Flag-in-Action (Ft Campbell)~~
P.O. Box 2416
New Providence, Tenn. 37040

~~Shakedown (Ft Dix)~~
P.O. Box 68
Wrightstown, N.Y. 08640

~~Fatigue Press (Ft Hood)~~
101 Avenue D
Killeen, Texas 74541

~~Short Times (Ft Jackson)~~
P.O. Box 543
Columbia, S.C. 29202

~~Last Harpers~~
P.O. Box 2994, Hill Station
Augusta, Ga. 30904

~~Logistic (Ft Sheridan)~~
9 S. Clinton
Chicago, Ill. 60606

~~Vietnam GI~~
P. O. Box 9273
Chicago, Ill. 60690

~~Open Sights (Wash., D.C. area)~~
Apt. 28, 2415 20th St. NW
Washington, D.C.

~~Task Force (Bay area)~~
546 Filmore Street
San Francisco, Calif.

~~The Bond~~
156 Fifth Ave. Room 633
New York, N.Y. 10010

~~Fun Travel & Adventure
(Ft. Knox)~~
532 N. 20th St.
Louisville, Ky. 40203

~~Counterpoint! (Ft. Lewis &
McChord AFB)~~
515 20th Avenue East
Seattle, Wash. 98102

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